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Abstract
Background: The ability to recognize the faces of potential cooperators and cheaters is fundamental to social exchanges,
given that cooperation for mutual benefit is expected. Studies addressing biases in face recognition have so far proved
inconclusive, with reports of biases towards faces of cheaters, biases towards faces of cooperators, or no biases at all. This
study attempts to uncover possible causes underlying such discrepancies.
Methodology and Findings: Four experiments were designed to investigate biases in face recognition during social
exchanges when behavioral descriptors (prosocial, antisocial or neutral) embedded in different scenarios were tagged to
faces during memorization. Face recognition, measured as accuracy and response latency, was tested with modified yes-no,
forced-choice and recall tasks (N=174). An enhanced recognition of faces tagged with prosocial descriptors was observed
when the encoding scenario involved financial transactions and the rules of the social contract were not explicit
(experiments 1 and 2). Such bias was eliminated or attenuated by making participants explicitly aware of ‘‘cooperative’’,
‘‘cheating’’ and ‘‘neutral/indifferent’’ behaviors via a pre-test questionnaire and then adding such tags to behavioral
descriptors (experiment 3). Further, in a social judgment scenario with descriptors of salient moral behaviors, recognition of
antisocial and prosocial faces was similar, but significantly better than neutral faces (experiment 4).
Conclusion: The results highlight the relevance of descriptors and scenarios of social exchange in face recognition, when
the frequency of prosocial and antisocial individuals in a group is similar. Recognition biases towards prosocial faces
emerged when descriptors did not state the rules of a social contract or the moral status of a behavior, and they point to the
existence of broad and flexible cognitive abilities finely tuned to minor changes in social context.
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Introduction
Faces are salient and highly relevant visual stimuli to social
interactions[1,2,3]and trait judgments ofotherscanbe made inless
than a second and from a minimal amount of information [4,5].
Hence, face recognition skills are developed from early childhood
onwards and rely on recollection and familiarity to judge whether a
face seen presently has occurred earlier [6,7]. Research examining
the cognitive processes involved in social exchange finds that across
a broad array of exchanges, individuals displaying prosocial (e.g.
cooperation) and antisocial (e.g. cheating) behaviors are tagged with
symbols or labels, which are later used to decide about
approachability or avoidance, trust or distrust [8]. One function
of prosocial behavior is that it enhances group cohesion, which
provides individual benefits to group members by increasing
individual well-being, maximizing gains, and increasing safety and
security for individuals existing within that group. Cooperation is
associated with greater group identification [9], loyalty [10] and
trust [11]. Antisocial behavior however, serves to undermine group
cohesion [12],and is usuallypunished through socialexclusion [13].
According to Cosmides, Barrett and Tooby [14], cheaters take
advantage of a social contract by intentionally failing to share its cost
and, therefore, need to be detected early to avoid exploitation.
Reputations are also remembered such that ‘second order’ rewards
occur in the form of support for those who favor cooperation [15].
Social exchanges such as tit-for-tat and reciprocal altruism rely
on cooperation for mutual benefit, and are suggested to operate
via a rational choice model based on economic principles of costs
and gains analysis. The theory of reciprocal altruism, [16] suggests
that cooperation can evolve when people are able to identify
cheaters and redirect their prosocial behavior towards cooperators
who are likely to reciprocate [17]. Further, reputations for
cooperative behavior have been shown to advance social status
[18] allowing competitive altruism to emerge [19]. However,
prosocial behaviors pose an interesting dilemma for social and
evolutionary psychology researchers, who in the 1970’s and 1980’s
started using models to uncover the conditions necessary for
cooperation to occur. Results from models based mainly on the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game and a computer tournament offered
some glimpses into how cooperation based on reciprocity may
start, thrive and finally succeed in an asocial environment [20].
Some researchers proposed that humans may be equipped with
an altruism-detection mechanism [21]. In a zero-acquaintance
video presentation paradigm, for example, participants were able
to accurately detect altruists just by looking at certain recorded
facial expressions [22]. In addition, enhanced signal changes in
the face-processing area of the fusiform gyrus have been recorded
during trustworthiness judgments [23,24]. Cosmides and Tooby
[25,26], conversely, argue that in order to engage successfully in
social exchanges, the architecture of the human brain evolved to
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problems, embracing a powerful mechanism to detect cheaters.
In support of their computational social theory of social
exchange, biases in recognition have been reported with faces
associated to behaviors categorized as antisocial [27,28]. Mealey,
Daood and Krage [29] found an enhanced memory for faces
tagged with descriptions indicating cheating or potential threat
and Chiappe, Brown, Dow, Koontz, Rodriguez, and McCulloch
[30] showed that accuracy was higher and gaze latency was
longer for faces of cheaters. Adding to the complexity of face
recognition in scenarios of social exchange, recent experiments
have reported no reliable biases for faces of cheaters or
cooperators [31,32].
Successful human social exchanges depend, to a large extent, on
accurate identification and trait judgments of group members.
According to Bayley, Wixted, Hopkins, and Squire [33], recollec-
tion entails remembering specific details about the event in which a
face was encountered, while familiarity entails simply knowing that
a face was seen before, even when no contextual information can be
retrieved. It has been proposed that recollection and familiarity
could be assessed differently by using the yes-no and forced-choice
procedures, respectively [34,35]. Accordingly, in a forced-choice
task individuals discriminate memorized faces from new ones on the
basis of relative familiarity (i.e., individuals see two or more faces
and have to choose the familiar/memorized one), while on a yes-no
task, successful performance involves some degree of recollection
(i.e., individuals only see one face and have to decide if it is familiar
or not) [33] (Figure 1).
The experiments described here use three different recognition
tasks (modified yes-no, four-alternative forced-choice and ‘‘classi-
cal’’ recall) to examine the extent to which face recognition can be
affected by different encoding scenarios and related moral status
(referred to as behavioral descriptors), when the number of
prosocial and antisocial faces to be encoded is the same. Face
recognition was tested in four experiments under two social
scenarios (financial transaction or social judgment) and variations
in the behavioral descriptors (prosocial, antisocial or neutral)
tagged to faces during encoding. The impact of making moral
behaviors explicit prior testing was also investigated.
Methods
All experiments had a similar core structure: (i) encoding
(memorization of behavioral descriptions and faces), (ii) memory
Figure 1. Schematic representation of procedures used in the study. Participants had to memorize three groups of faces. A screen with a
behavioral descriptor appeared before the presentation of each group of faces (prosocial, antisocial and neutral). The order of descriptors and
correspondent group of faces was randomized and counterbalanced. Memorization was followed by a distracter task (consolidation) consisting of a
series of multiplications. In the ‘‘yes/no’’ task each group had 4 faces and each face appeared in frontal and profile view (8 images/group; frontal view
always to the left of its profile view). Participants had to answer whether they had seen the displayed face before (50% tagged faces and 50% new
faces). In the 4-alternative forced-choice task each group also had 4 faces, but only in frontal view. In this task participants had to choose which of the
faces they had memorized (25% tagged faces, 75% new). The display for the recall task was similar to the yes/no task, but participants had to answer
whether the face they saw belonged to ‘‘cheaters’’, ‘‘neutrals’’, or ‘‘cooperators’’ instead (only tagged faces were presented). Tagged and new faces
were interleaved and presented randomly.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012939.g001
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recognition tasks. The within-subject independent variable was the
category of descriptors (antisocial, prosocial, neither, referred to as
neutral) and the dependent variables were the accuracy and the
response latency to correct responses. Partial g
2 is reported as an
effect-size measure.
Participants
Participants, all undergraduate students (N=174), were recruit-
ed via internal mail and provided written consent in accordance
with procedures approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty
of Art and Social Sciences (Psychology Unit) at Kingston
University and in accordance with the ethical guidelines of the
British Psychological Society. Some students received bonus
course credits, but no financial compensation for participation in
the experiments was given. All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and were between 18 and 38 years
old (modal age=21; some declined to give their age).
Materials
Photographs of an equal number of males and females were
taken from University College London XMT2VS database
(2276181 pixels). Both frontal and profile head-shot photographs
were used. In the pictures, all ‘‘actors’’ stood against a dark blue
background and had neutral expressions. At approximately 50 cm
from the centre of the monitor, pictures had a viewing angle of
6.865.5 degrees. E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh,
PA) was used for stimulus presentation.
General procedure
After reading and signing the consent forms, participants were
told the experiments were about memory for faces, but were not
cued about the type of memory task employed. Figure 1 shows a
schematic representation of the general procedure. In the
encoding phase a screen introduced the social context, referred
to as scenario (see below), before presenting a screen with one of
three categories of descriptors of moral behavior (prosocial,
antisocial or neutral). Each descriptor preceded a screen with a
group of 4 faces (50% males, 50% females) in frontal and profile
views (8 pictures, experiments 1 and 3) or in frontal view only (4
pictures, experiment 2). Each group in experiment 4 contained 6
faces, all in frontal view. Profile views were introduced to test the
strength of memorization since there are suggestions that
familiarization with frontal and profile views enhance face
recognition [36]. The order of group presentation was random-
ized. The time to read the descriptors was unlimited, but the
duration of face encoding was 6 sec for each group in experiments
1 and 3 and unlimited for groups in experiments 2 and 4. Willis
and Todorov [4] showed that just 100 msec of exposure to a
neutral face was enough for judgments about trustworthiness and
aggressiveness, for example.
The encoding phase was followed by the consolidation phase,
which consisted of a series of multiplications that lasted 3–5 min,
with answers entered with the keyboard and feedback provided.
This phase was followed by the face recognition tasks, described
in more detail for each experiment in the appropriate section (cf.
Fig. 1). A screen with the instructions related to a given task
appeared and participants pressed a key to continue when ready.
Participants were then asked to respond to the recognition task as
quickly and accurately as possible. Then a black fixation cross was
presented on a blank screen for 1 sec before the task started. The
trial order was randomized and feedback was provided. Note that
descriptor and group of faces were kept constant in experiments 1
and 3. Each group of faces was the same for all participants in
experiment 1. Faces in each group were then changed in
experiment 2 (50%), experiment 3 (25%), and in experiment 4
(1/3) in relation to experiment 1. Additional control experiments
for the faces used in this study are described in Results.
Scenarios
Scenario 1 (financial loan). Participants were given a
scenario adapted from Chiappe and colleagues [30]. The
introductory screen read: ‘‘Before you continue, it is important
to know that John is a successful businessman. Through his hard
work, he has managed to build a very good life for himself and his
family. He is also quite generous. He is willing to help out his long-
time friends by offering them loans when needed. In the next 3
screens you will meet John’s friends. Press any key to continue.’’
The next screen read: ‘‘You will see 3 groups of people. The
groups have different behaviors, which are specified in a screen
before their photos. Press any key to continue’’. Then, before
being shown the faces, prosocial, antisocial or neutral behavioral
tags were introduced. The content of the different behavioral tags
was: (prosocial) ‘‘This group of friends borrowed £25,000 from
John and paid it back with interest within a year’’; (antisocial)
‘‘This group of friends borrowed £25,000 from John and never
paid it back’’; (neutral) ‘‘This group of friends never borrow money
from John’’.
Note that the template for the conditional rule is of the form: ‘‘if
you take benefit P, then you must satisfy condition Q’’, but unlike
Chiappe and colleagues experiment, the descriptors here did not
specify the social contract rule nor mention the words ‘‘cheater’’ or
‘‘cooperator’’.
Scenario 2 (social judgment). The first screen contained
the following instruction: ‘‘You will see 3 groups of people. The
groups have different behaviors, which are specified in a screen
before their photos. Press any key to continue’’. The behavioral
tags were: (prosocial) ‘‘The people you will see in this set have:
donated £10,000 to charity, worked with children in Africa,
helped elderly people, fostered over 10 children, raised over
£1,000 by running a marathon’’; (antisocial) ‘‘The people you will
see in this set have committed some illegal actions: sold over 1000
illegal DVDs, drove whilst disqualified, invaded a football pitch,
committed major benefit fraud, kidnapped a young woman’’;
(neutral) ‘‘The people you will see in this set have different
hobbies: shopping at Tesco, swimming and walking, driving fancy
cars, eating out’’. Again, descriptors did not specify the social
contract rule nor mention the words ‘‘cheater’’ or ‘‘cooperator’’,
but used instead words strongly linked to prosocial (e.g., donated,
charity, helped, fostered), antisocial (e.g., illegal, invaded, fraud,
kidnapped) and neutral behaviors (e.g., hobbies, shopping,
swimming, eating out), confirmed in a pilot experiment with six
participants.
Analysis
Average mean accuracy and response latency, also referred to as
reaction time (RT), were subjected to a repeated-measures
ANOVA with four behavioral contexts: prosocial, antisocial,
neutral and new (untagged faces)62 angles of view (frontal vs.
profile) as the factors. The recall task had only the first three
categories. Accuracy or RT values used in the statistical analysis
represented the average of 144–192 trials, i.e. 36–48 trials per
condition/participant. Participants with overall accuracy below
60% (i.e. (prosocial+antisocial+neutral+new)/4) in a yes-no
recognition task were eliminated from the analysis, as their overall
performance was too close to chance level (N=15). In the recall
task no participants were eliminated (chance level around 33%).
Greenhouse-Geeiser adjustments to the degrees of freedom were
Face Recognition Biases
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sphericity test). All pairwise comparisons were carried out with
Bonferroni adjustments.
Results
Control Experiment
The baseline accuracy and response latency, referred to as RT,
for face recognition was established with two control experiments.
In each experiment an introductory screen read simply: ‘‘The next
screen shows some of John’s friends. Press any key to continue’’.
Then three other screens were presented, each one of them
containing 6 faces to be memorized in the absence of an encoding
scenario; no behavioral descriptors were tagged to the faces. For
more details about the retention and recognition tasks see General
Methods.
The first recognition task (N=10, 8 women, 2 men) was a
modified yes-no task, which consisted of a single face presented in
the middle of the screen and participants had to answer whether
they had seen the face in the memorization phase or not by
pressing ‘‘1’’ for YES and ‘‘2’’ for NO (50% tagged faces and 50%
new faces). Note that this is a modified yes-no recognition task, in
that not only each of the encoded faces were presented 3 times (i.e.
3 cycles of trials), but also each of the new, non-tagged faces.
Therefore, in the first cycle of trials, participants simply had to
remember the memorized, tagged faces and which were the new,
untagged faces. In the remaining two cycles of trials, the task
became harder since by now all faces became ‘‘familiar’’, either
because they had been encoded during the memorization phase or
because they had been presented in the first (and second) cycles of
trials.
The second recognition task (N=13; 11 women, 2 men), the
four-alternative forced-choice task, consisted of four faces
displayed around an imaginary circle at the centre of the screen:
one face belonged to one of three tagged groups, while the other
three faces were new. Participants had to choose the location of
the tagged face (left, right, top, or bottom) by pressing designated
keys in the keyboard. Faces were presented in each of the four
positions and the order of the presentation varied randomly across
trials.
In the absence of behavioral information during face encoding,
no significant differences in accuracy were observed between the
groups of untagged faces in the two experiments, F,1. Overall
accuracy in the modified yes-no (M=93%, S.E.=2) and in the
forced-choice (M=89%6S.E.=3) recognition tasks was similar
and no significant differences in RT were observed
(23816205 msec and 21386162 msec, respectively). Accuracy
to the 18 individual faces was also similar, F(17,22)=1.20, p=.26.
Table 1 shows the accuracy and reaction times of obtained in all
experiments described here.
Table 1. Accuracy (%) and reaction time (msec) for the recognition and recollection of faces in frontal view and tagged with
descriptors of antisocial, prosocial, or neutral behaviors (mean 6 SE).
Accuracy (%)
Antisocial Prosocial Neutral New
Experiment 1
yes-no task 63638 5 63** 67637 5 63
recall task 43635 3 63* 3663
Experiment 2 (forced-choice)8 8 639 2 62** 8563
Experiment 3
yes-no task (questionnaire+descriptors) 79637 8 637 6 637 2 63
yes-no task (short descriptors only) 74638 4 637 7 637 5 63
Experiment 4
yes-no task 7862* 8362* 70627 9 62
recall task 5163** 5063** 3463
Reaction Time (msec)
Antisocial Prosocial Neutral New
Experiment 1
yes-no task 1036649 860638** 948641 1034653
recall task 11566128 1053696 14166111
Experiment 2 (forced-choice) 1877681 1809664 1911667
Experiment 3
yes-no task (questionnaire+descriptors) 1270666 1138645 1393657 1316655
yes-no task (short descriptors only) 1094646 1009657 1132658 1225674
Experiment 4
yes-no task 975631* 931629* 1053635 1061631
recall task 1927676* 24786141 22656118
*p,.05, ANOVA.
**p,.001, ANOVA.
Next to experiment number is the type of recognition task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012939.t001
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This experiment was designed to test whether brief behavioral
information tagged to faces in a financial encoding scenario (i.e.,
borrowing £25000 and paying it back or not) would lead to face
recognition biases when using a set of different recognition tasks.
This experiment used a scenario adapted from Chiappe and
colleagues (2004), where the moral status of the behavioral
descriptors was made explicit by using the words ‘‘cheaters’’ or
‘‘cooperators’’. In this experiment, however, descriptors simply
described a behavior and were not accompanied by words
making their moral status explicit. The aim was to investigate
whether the omission of such explicit terms would affect face
recognition.
Method. There were 26 participants (18 women, 8 men), all
university students. Scenario 1 (financial) was used. The
experiment had 24 faces from 12 actors (50% frontal and 50%
profile views) and each of the three behavioral categories had 8
faces (from 4 actors) to be memorized.
Two recognition tasks were employed: a modified yes-no task
and a recall task. The modified yes-no task was introduced by a
screen with the instruction: ‘‘Have you seen this face before?’’
Press: 1=yes, 2=no. The instruction for the recall task was: ‘‘Is
the face you see linked to cooperators, cheaters or neutral
behaviors?’’ Press: 1=cooperators, 2=cheaters, 3=neutrals. Note
that participants had to equate the prosocial descriptor with
‘‘cooperators’’ and the antisocial descriptor with ‘‘cheaters’’.
After reading the instructions and pressing a key to continue
participants saw a black fixation cross on a blank screen (1 sec),
followed by a face (tagged or new one), which remained on the
screen until one of the possible responses to the given task was
selected and entered with the keypad.
Results. Modified yes-no task: The repeated presentation of
new, untagged faces alongside tagged faces instead of a unique
presentation of each face in early studies may have lead to a
slightly higher level of errors, but trial repetition conferred
robustness to the averaged accuracy values reported here.
Results showed a significant recognition bias to tagged faces,
F(3,75)=12.44, p,.001, g
2=.33 (Table 1). An enhanced
recognition of prosocial faces was observed in comparison to
antisocial, neutral and new faces (p,.02; Figure 2a). Recognition
of antisocial and neutral faces was similar, but there was an
interaction between tags and viewing angle, F(3,111)=6.10,
p,.001, g
2=0.14. Accuracy for antisocial and neutral faces in
frontal view was higher than when in profile view, F(3,37)=13.46,
P=0.001, g
2=0.27, but still lower than for cooperators, p,.001.
RT also varied with tags, F(3,75)=9.40, p,.001, g
2=.27
(Figure 2b). RT for prosocial faces was shorter than for
antisocial, neutral, and new faces. There were no significant
differences in latencies related to viewing angle, F(1,37)=3.03,
p=0.09. Part of the results related to profile views of the tagged
faces was presented at the Conference of the European and
Human Behaviour Association [37].
Recall task: Fourteen participants run the recall test straight
after the recognition test. As expected, recall also varied with
behavioral tags, F(2,32)=7.86, p=.002, g
2=.33 (Table 1).
Accuracy rates for recall (three-alternative forced choice task;
chance level at 33%).were lower than for recognition. Again, mean
accuracy for prosocial faces was higher than for antisocial and
neutral faces (p,.02; Figure 2b). The enhanced recognition of
prosocial faces was observed with faces in frontal and in profile
views. There was also a significant difference in RT,
F(2,32)=4.22, p=.024, g
2=.21, with neutral faces demanding
more time for correct recall than prosocial and antisocial faces.
Discussion. In agreement with the result of Chiappe and
colleagues’ [30], we also found a longer RT for faces of cheaters,
but unlike their results showing a better recognition of cheaters, we
found that prosocial faces were recognized and recalled better and
quicker than antisocial or neutral faces. The higher accuracy rates
for prosocial faces cannot be explained by familiarity alone as
participants were able to recall the behavioral context tagged to
the faces. In addition, results showed that high prosocial accuracy
was obtained with shorter response latencies.
The absence of an explicit warning about the presence of
cheaters in the descriptors tagged to faces might explain the
relative lower accuracy to cheaters in this experiment. The
ability to recognize faces of cooperators accurately is advanta-
geous, as it allows us to approach them in future instances of
exchange and avoid cheaters [22,38]. In line with this findings,
Price [39] reported that people displayed a tendency to favor
more cooperative workers, while Oda, Hiraishi and Matsumoto-
Oda [40] suggest that an independent altruist-detection
algorithm would be activated when a relationship of social
exchange with another person has not been established. Once
social exchanges have occurred, a cheater-detection mechanism
would be activated to maintain the relationship. In other words,
the ability to detect altruists and cooperate exclusively with
them would reduce the probability of exploitation in social
interactions [21].
Figure 2. Accuracy (a) and reaction time (b) for recognition
(blank columns) and recall (white columns) of faces tagged in a
financial scenario with brief descriptions associated with
antisocial (ANTI), prosocial (PRO), neutral (NEUTRAL) behav-
iors or New faces (error bars show +S.E.).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012939.g002
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Bastin and Van der Linden [34] proposed that recollection
and familiarity can be assessed differently by using the yes/no
and forced-choice procedures. As mentioned previously, in a
forced-choice task individuals discriminate memorized faces
from new ones on the basis of relative familiarity (i.e., they see
two or more faces and have to choose the familiar one), while on
ay e s - n ot a s k ,s u c c e s s f u lp e r f o r m a n c ei n v o l v e ss o m ed e g r e eo f
recollection (i.e., individua l so n l ys e eo n ef a c ea n dh a v et o
decide if it is familiar or not) [33]. The aim with this experiment
was to investigate if the recognition biases observed in
experiment 1 using the yes-no and the recall tests would be
still present if faces were presented alongside distracter faces in a
four-alternative forced-choice recognition task, a likely scenario
in many social exchanges. If the recognition bias for prosocial
f a c e so b s e r v e di ne x p e r i m e n t1w a ss t r o n ga n dr e l i a b l e ,i ts h o u l d
also be observed in a four-alternative forced-choice recognition
task.
Method. This experiment also used the financial scenario
(N=29; 24 women, 4 men). The recognition task employed the
four-alternative forced-choice task (cf. control experiment). The
task was introduced by a screen with instructions about how to
proceed in the test phase: ‘‘Choose the face you have seen before
by pressing the key correspondent to its location on the screen’’,
y=top, b=bottom, g=left, h=right. Tagged faces were
presented in each of the four positions and the order of the
presentation also varied randomly across trials. Then a black
fixation cross was presented on a blank screen for 1 sec and it was
followed by four faces (all in frontal view); one face always
belonged to the memorized set and 3 faces were new ones. Trials
were randomized and feedback was given.
Results. The recognition biases towards prosocial faces
observed in Experiment 1 was confirmed with a different
paradigm, F(2,56)=5.23, p=.008, g
2=.16. Accuracy to
prosocial faces was higher than to neutral and antisocial faces
(p,.001). No significant differences in RT were observed,
F(2,56)=2.58, p=.084 (Table 1).
Discussion. The results obtained with this task confirmed the
prosocial face bias observed in experiment 1 with the modified yes-
no and the recall tasks. Sometimes faces can be clearly familiar,
but some can fall in a ‘‘grey area’’ forcing the use of whatever
information is available for proper evaluation [41]. Therefore, if
this recognition task was purely measuring familiarity, one would
expect equal performance to all tagged faces.
Experiment 3
The behavioral tags linked to faces did not contain the terms
cooperators, cheaters or neutrals. The lack of an explicit warning
to the presence of a cheating/defective behavior during encoding
could have favored biases to prosocial faces. The aim of this
experiment was to check if priming and/or more concise
behavioral descriptors than the ones used in Experiments 1 and
2 would affect face recognition. It was hypothesized that
recognition biases would be eliminated by clearly alerting
participants to the presence of cheating and cooperative behaviors
prior testing.
Method. The first part of this experiment (priming and added
short descriptors) had 31 participants (16 women, 15 men).
Before the test started participants had to answer three
questions on paper:
1. How important do you think it is to remember people who
cheated on you?
2. How important do you think it is to remember people who
cooperated with you?
3. How important do you think it is to remember people who
behaved in an indifferent way to you?
The options for each question were: (a) very important, (b)
important, (c) relatively important, (d) not so important, and (e)
neutral. The questions aimed to direct the attention to the salient
aspects of the encoding condition participants would find in the
recognition test that followed.
After filling in the questionnaire, participants run the first part
of the experiment. The set up was identical to experiment 1,
except for the above questionnaire and a short sentence added to
each of the previous behavioral descriptors containing the explicit
moral status. In the prosocial descriptor the sentence added was
‘‘John judges them as cooperators’’; while for the antisocial one the
sentence was ‘‘John judges them as cheaters’’ and for neutral it was
‘‘John judges them as neutrals’’.
The second part of this experiment had 20 participants (18
women and 2 men) as participants. No questionnaires were used
and the social reputation contained in the descriptors in
experiment 1 was made explicit and contained solely the sentences
added in the experiment above (e.g., ‘‘John judges them as
cheaters’’).
Results. About 64% of the students judged remembering
cheaters very important (36%) or important (28%), while for the
majority of them (92%) remembering cooperators was very
important (67%) or important (25%). Only 39% of the students
considered very important or important to remembering people
who ignored them. The results echo the performance observed
with face recognition in the previous experiment (Table 1).
Questionnaire, long and short descriptors: The recognition
biases observed in experiments 1 and 2 disappeared with this
setup, F(3,90)=1, p=.36. Recognition accuracy for prosocial faces
was reduced from 85% in Experiment 1 to 77%, while accuracy
for antisocial faces increased from 63% to 77% and from 67% to
74% for neutral faces. RT was slightly higher than in Experiment
1 and varied with tags, F(3,90)=4.22, p=.008, g
2=.12. RT for
prosocial and antisocial faces was similar, but RT for neutral and
new faces was higher than for prosocial faces (p,.005).
Short descriptors only: Recognition biases were strongly
dampened and accuracy for all tagged faces tended to be more
similar than in the priming experiment, F(3,57)=2.68, p=.055.
The only significant difference in RT was for new faces,
F(3,57)=7.72, p,.001, g
2=.29.
Discussion. The similar accuracies for the three behavioral
tags when reputations were made explicit, in the presence or
absence of priming, point to a more equitable distribution of
attentional resources during face encoding. Overall accuracy in
these two experiments (about 76%) was lower than the accuracy in
the control experiment (about 90%), suggesting that behavioral
scenarios during face encoding affected performance.
Interestingly, the dampening of accuracy and response latency to
prosocial faces in the presence of priming was stronger than with
explicit reputations only.
The absence of biases in face recognition found here and in
previous experiments [31,32,42] could be seen as an indicator of
the significance of remembering both cheaters and cooperators.
After all, from a natural selection point of view, the only relevant
output is the successful identification of cheaters and cooperators
with as low a cost and error rate as possible, since such ability is
essential for both direct reciprocal cooperation [43], and
reciprocity based on reputation [15].
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According to experiments on reciprocal altruism, an enhanced
memory for both prosocial and antisocial individuals exists in
order to correctly identify those who deserve to be rewarded with
cooperative acts. The last experiments showed that face recogni-
tion bias can be modulated by the wording in behavioral
descriptors in a social exchange scenario. In the first two
experiments, the rules of the social contract and the moral status
of the behaviors were not explicitly stated in the descriptors. It is
possible that recognition biases may be avoided in a scenario
where the described behaviors are strongly associated with
cooperation or cheating, even though the rules or moral status
are not explicit. This experiment investigates recognition and
recall biases using a wider range of descriptors clearly linked to
prosocial and antisocial behaviors in each behavioral tag. As
remarked previously, descriptors used words strongly linked to
prosocial (e.g., donated, charity, helped, fostered), antisocial (e.g.,
illegal, invaded, fraud, kidnapped) and neutral behaviors (e.g.,
hobbies, shopping, swimming, eating out), but neither rules of
social contract nor the explicit moral status of the behaviors were
stated.
Method. Fifty seven participants (45 women, 12 men), all
university students, took part in this experiment. Scenario 2 (social
judgment) was used in this experiment which had 18 faces in
frontal view only and each of the three behavioral categories had 6
faces to be memorized. The recognition tasks used in this
experiment were the same as in Experiment 1.
Results. Modified yes-no task: There was a significant
recognition bias to tagged faces, F(2.59,152.54)=13.65, p,.001,
g
2=.21 (Figure 3a). Recognition of prosocial, antisocial and new
faces was significantly more accurate than neutral faces (p=.004,
Table 1). On the other hand, RT varied strongly with behavioral
tags, F(2.66,156.62)=18.34, p,.001, g
2=.24. prosocial and
antisocial faces were recognized faster than neutral and new
faces (p=.007, Figure 3b).
Recall task: As observed with the recognition task, recall of faces
also varied with tags, F(2,118)=10.61, p,.001, g
2=.15. Note that
performance at chance level here is at around 33%. Accuracy to
prosocial and antisocial faces was similar, but better than neutral
faces (Figure 3a). RT for recall also varied with tag,
F(2,118)=6.70, p=.002, g
2=.10. Although accuracy in recogni-
tion was similar for antisocial and prosocial faces, antisocial faces
were recalled significantly faster than prosocial and neutral faces
(p=.02) (Figure 3b).
Discussion. In the recognition task, participants’ recognition
of prosocial and antisocial faces was similar but still better than for
neutral ones. The enhanced recognition of faces of cheaters can be
advantageous to societies too [44]. The social exchange
computation theory [25,26] proposes that successful and stable
social exchanges depend on an evolved brain with a cognitive
ability to detect cheaters. By remembering those who are selfish or
unkind to others, a decision not to help or even avoid this person
in the future can be made, thus stabilizing reciprocity [16,22].
Response latencies for antisocial faces were markedly faster than
for prosocial faces, a result opposite to the one observed when the
encoding scenarios referred to financial transactions. The
behaviors used in antisocial tags contain activities clearly classified
as criminal (e.g., kidnap of a young woman), which might have led
to faster reaction times, although not to a higher accuracy to
antisocial faces. This explanation is supported by research which
found that that priming category information increased the ease of
judgment-relevant information retrieval during impression forma-
tion when no prior memory of behavior was present [45]. It is also
possible that the antisocial behaviors listed in the scenario were
considered more negative than the prosocial behaviors were
considered positive, potentially enhancing response latencies due
to negativity biases in person perception [46]. The difference in
response latency between the groups of faces might have occurred
due to differences in the saliency of words linked to antisocial
behaviors (e.g., illegal, invaded, fraud, kidnapped) in comparison
to words linked to prosocial behaviors (e.g., donated, charity,
helped, fostered) and neutral behaviors (e.g. hobbies, shopping,
swimming, eating out). Although similar accuracy for faces in
prosocial and antisocial groups point to similar saliency, more data
is necessary to confirm this finding.
Discussion
The results reported here show that recognition biases,
measured as accuracy and response latency, are modulated by
the social context and correspondent behavioral descriptors tagged
to faces during encoding. Control experiments confirmed that
recognition of faces encoded in the absence of such descriptors was
similar. Experiments 1 and 2 used a financial encoding scenario
and revealed an enhanced recognition of prosocial faces when the
moral status of the behavioral descriptors tagged to faces was not
explicit (e.g., the words ‘‘cooperators’’ and ‘‘cheaters’’ were absent
and rules of social contract were not stated). The higher accuracy
Figure 3. Accuracy (a) and reaction time (b) for recognition
(black columns) and recall (white columns) of faces tagged in a
social judgment scenario with brief descriptions associated
with antisocial (ANTI), prosocial (PRO) and neutral (NEUTRAL)
behaviors or New faces (error bars show +S.E.).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012939.g003
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shorter response latencies, i.e., participants recognized prosocial
faces better and faster than antisocial or neutral faces. Experiment
3 showed that such bias could be eliminated, or significantly
attenuated, when the moral status was made explicit by adding the
words ‘‘cooperators’’, ‘‘cheaters’’, and ‘‘neutrals’’ to the descriptors
and by making participants aware of the importance they assign to
identifying people who display cooperative, cheating and neutral/
indifferent moral behaviors via a pre-test questionnaire. Finally,
experiment 4 showed that accuracy for prosocial and antisocial
faces was similar but higher than for neutral faces in a social
judgment encoding scenario, which contained a range of
descriptors with salient moral status. Response latency to antisocial
faces in such encoding scenario was faster than response latency to
prosocial and neutral faces.
The speed and accuracy of judgments like trustworthiness can
be impaired by incongruent information about traits and the
behavioral events in which they occurred [45]. Experiment 4,
however, offered quick access to relevant information about the
moral status of faces and the context in which they appeared. The
faster latencies observed for antisocial behaviors in this experiment
may be explained by the finding that negative (and extreme) rather
than positive (and moderate) moral behaviors are considered more
diagnostic of trait behavior, whereas positive rather than negative
competency-related behaviors are considered more diagnostic
[47]. Participants may therefore have assigned a moral category to
faces associated with antisocial-immoral rather than prosocial-
moral behaviors more quickly in this experiment, making
recognition of these faces faster.
As mentioned previously, it is important to remember faces of
cheaters and cooperators alike to know who to approach and who
to avoid in any future instance of social exchange [31,42]. Barclay
[48] suggested that biases in face recognition were modulated by
the frequency of faces tagged as cheaters or cooperators in the
sample; cheater recognition would be enhanced when they were
the minority but it would declined when they were the majority.
When the proportion of cheaters and cooperators was the same, a
bias towards cooperators would emerge, in agreement with our
results in experiments 1 and 2. The relative frequency of cheaters
and cooperators, however, is not enough to explain the range of
biases reported herein and in early studies. The financial scenario
in experiments 1 and 2 was adapted from one of the scenarios used
by Chiappe and colleagues [30] where the rules of the social
contract and correspondent moral status were added to the
descriptors tagged to faces. They reported longer response
latencies and better accuracy for faces of cheaters and interpreted
the results as supporting a cheater detection mechanism. The
pattern of results showed a trade-off between accuracy (high) and
response latency (longer). We also found longer response latencies
for faces of cheaters than cooperators, but accuracy to cheaters
was lower than for cooperators (i.e., no trade-offs). The disparity in
results might be explained by the absence of statements about rules
of social contract in the descriptors in this study. This idea is
reinforced by the absence of memory biases in experiment 3 due to
the effect of a pre-test questionnaire and words in the descriptors
making explicit reference to cheating, cooperation and neutral/
indifferent behaviors. This is in line with more recent studies
reporting an absence of biases in face recognition [31,42].
Variations in experimental setup might be responsible for some
of the discrepancies between this and early studies where
participants had to complete different tasks while memorizing
the faces (e.g., attractiveness ratings), the interval for memorization
was often unrestricted, the moral status of behaviors was made
explicit during encoding, and accuracy was usually capped at high
values (usually .90%) [27,29,31,42,49]. In our experiments a
wider range of accuracies was analyzed (.60% in modified yes-no
and forced-choice tasks or .33% in recall tasks) and accuracy for
each participant was the average of 3–4 trials/face/descriptor,
conferring robustness to the final accuracy values used in statistical
analysis.
Todorov and colleagues [50] found that people were better at
categorizing faces which were associated with nice behaviors, than
faces associated with aggressive or disgusting behaviors, and that
faces associated with positive or negative behaviors were easier to
categorize than those associated neutral behaviors. Faces associ-
ated with prosocial or antisocial behaviors evoked a stronger
response in particular brain regions (e.g., the anterior paracingu-
late cortex and areas of the superior temporal sulcus) than faces
that were not associated with behaviors. Singer and colleagues
[23] showed strong activation of areas primarily involved in the
processing of socially relevant information when faces of
cooperators were presented. The amygdala, a subcortical brain
region vital for fear conditioning and consolidation of emotional
memories [51], has also been linked to the assessment of face
trustworthiness [24,52,53]. These findings support our conclusion
that face processing and recognition is highly dependent on the
social context and associated behavioral information encoded.
Biases in face recognition may emerge in some scenarios of
social exchange if the rules of social contract and behavioral moral
status are ambiguous. A transactional relationship between face
recognition and social context (with its descriptors, social contract
rules, social diversity, and relative frequency of cheaters and
cooperators) needs to be established in order to predict recognition
biases in different scenarios of social exchange. The results
described here showed that the presence or absence of statements
about the moral status and rules of social contract in descriptors
tagged to learned faces led to diverging results. In the absence of
such information, participants tended to show an enhanced
recognition of cooperators. Furthermore, in diverse social
scenarios, individuals in a community under the influence of
social norms tend to cooperate even in the absence of mechanisms
based on punishment [54]. Taken together, the biases in
recognition reported here show that far from being narrowly
customized to a fixed type of response, face recognition employs
broad and flexible cognitive mechanisms finely tuned to minor
changes in the content of social and behavioral information
encoded with faces.
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